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Abstract: One of the key events in the relations between the Athenians and Thebans was the 
Plataian decision to align themselves with the Athenians at the end of the sixth century BCE. 
This decision shook up the contemporary political landscape and proved to be a source of 
hostility between the two neighbouring polities throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. The 
orthodox view holds that the original alignment took place in 519 during the Peisistratid tyranny, 
based on the date given by Thucydides 3.68.5. This date, in the mind of some scholars, seems 
contradictory with the story of the Plataian alignment as given by Herodotus (6.108.1-6.). This 
inconsistency resulted in a search for alternatives that fit the Herodotean narrative better. To 
accommodate this change, they relied on emendating the Thucydidean text, but there is no sign 
of corruption in this part. Emendation of a text is best avoided, although the controversy merits 
attention. Therefore, in this article it will be argued that the two narratives – the Thucydidean and 
the Herodotean – need to be separated. What follows is a renewed chronology of Plataian-
Athenian relations. The orthodox date (519) was the date of an original Peisistratid-Plataian 
alliance that did not lead to hostilities with Thebes. Instead, it is in the context of the foundation 
of the Athenian democracy and the subsequent clashes with Thebes after 507/6 that the 
Herodotean narrative should be placed.  
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Boiotia was known in antiquity for its endemic, internecine conflict. That is perhaps best 
reflected in a phrase attributed to Pericles. He compares the Boiotians to holm-oaks; for just as 
these are beaten down by knocking against each other, so are they taken down by their civil 
strife.
1
 Even the largest and biggest polis in the region, Thebes, had difficulties maintaining a 
grasp over its neighbours. Several of these openly detested and refused renewed attempts of 
hegemonic control. The most notorious dissidents were the Plataians, and their proximity to 
Athens aided their recalcitrance. In later times the latter served as their enabler by proxy. The 
imbroglio of intra-Boiotian relations and their position vis-à-vis the Athenians have intrigued 
scholars since the nineteenth century. This article is a renewed attempt to detail the changing 
political landscape of central Greece at the end of the sixth century, as it was in this context the 
Plataian alliance with the Athenians took place. Novel advances in our understanding of early 
common polities and new epigraphic finds from Thebes offer potential for an unconventional 
scope on these capricious times. Orthodoxy has dictated that the two sources elaborating the 
origins of this relationship, Thucydides and Herodotus, are compatible and refer to the same 
event, creating a uniform history of these events guided by the principle that a Plataian-Athenian 
rapprocement automatically led to conflict with Thebes. But the authors do not claim to describe 
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Arist. Rhet. 3.4: καὶ εἰς Βοιωτούς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις: τούς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ 
τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένου. All translations are my own, unless otherwise stated. 
the same event: that is a retrojection by modern scholars. Thucydides only mentions a date, with 
the Plataians themselves providing the background story for an Athenian alliance. Herodotus 
does describe events leading to an alliance but without mentioning a date.  
 Traditionally, the story follows the account of Herodotus. In 519, the Thebans and 
Plataians had a conflict as a result of Theban expansionism. The Plataians approach several 
candidates, who rebuff them. Only when they approach the Athenians as supplicants do they find 
protection from Theban aggression. That provided the Peisistratids – the tyrants of Athens – with 
a religious reason to accept the Plataian plea. The alliance agitated the Thebans and from then 
on, their relationship with their two southern neighbours was marked by conflict. Even the 
change in leadership in Athens – from tyranny to democracy – did not change the situation. A 
close reading of both texts reveals that we may have been misled through the historical agents – 
the Plataians – that created this past to reflect the situation in their present. Their identity 
depended on opposition to Thebes with the help of Athens. What that created is the history 
described in both Thucydides and Herodotus as we have it today. Yet underneath there lurks a 
possibility to approach these texts with an open mind and avoid the pitfalls of following 
historical narratives created by others. 
Therefore in this article what will be argued instead is that both accounts need to be 
separated as the authors treat different accounts altogether. Thucydides’ firm dating of an 
Plataian-Athenian alliance – 519 – allows for little manoeuvring. Herodotus’ account, on the 
other hand, appears to resemble the situation of a later date, 507/6.
2
 In treating both accounts 
separately, it is possible to disentangle the two alliances from their fifth century trappings and 
open up the discussion to eventualities that reflect a different history, rather than the one that was 
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 All dates are B.C.E. unless stated otherwise. The date of the alliance, 519, is based on Thuc. 3.68.5: καὶ τὰ μὲν 
κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν (“Such 
was the end of Plataia in the ninety-third year after she became an Athenian ally”).. 
remembered by the fifth-century Plataians and reflected in the writings of both Thucydides and 
Herodotus.  
Of course, close reading can only take us so far. After arguing for a separation of the two 
accounts, contextualising the divorced events can offer a plausible backdrop to explain why it is 
possible we are dealing with two different accounts as this separation adds a multi-layered facet 
to the dominant narratives of Atheno-Boiotian relations. Contrary to the inevitable conflict 
professed in other works, here it will be asserted that the Plataians initially entertained friendly 
ties with their Theban neighbours. Only when the latter attempted to tighten their grip over the 
region and the koinon did things turn sour. This coincided with the ascension of the Athenian 
democracy and their repeated attempts to consolidate the northern frontier of the Attic peninsula. 
These political changes had a profound effect on matters in central Greece and form the 
backdrop to the Plataian alliance as described by Herodouts.  
In the first section the Herodotean account will be analysed and placed against the 
fragmentary and scanty historical knowledge of the late sixth century, coupled with an 
assessment of Thucydides’ aims and goals in offering a date for the alliance. What follows is a 
commentary on the presumed hostilities that flared up after the Plataian alliance. The third 
section deals with the political changes in the late sixth century and offers these as a more 
plausible environment for the Herodotean account.  
I An analysis of Herodotus and Thucydides 
The origin of the Plataian alliance is described by Herodotus in the lead-up to the Battle at 
Marathon to explain the appearance of a Plataian contingent on the battlefield (Hdt. 6.108.1-6): 
Ὰθεναιοισι δὲ τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένεϊ  Ἡρακλέος ἐπῆλθον Βοηθέοντες Πλαταιἐες πανδεμεί. 
Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐδεδώκεσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι οι Πλαταιέες, καὶ πόνους ὑπὲρ 
αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηεναῖοι συχοὺς ἤδη ἀναρ αιπέατο: ἔδοσαν δὲ ὧδε. πιεζεύμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων οἱ 
Πλαταιέες ἐδίδοσαν πρῶτα παρατυχοῦσι Κλεομένεΐ τε τῷ Ἀναξανδρίδεω καὶ 
Λακεδαιμονίοισι σφέας αὐτούς. οἳ δὲ οὐ δεκόμενοι ἔλεγόν σφι τάδε. ‘ἡμεῖς μὲν ἑκαστέρω τε 
οἰκέομεν, καὶ ὑμῖν τοιήδε τις γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐπικουρίη ψυχρή· φθαίητε γὰρ ἂν πολλάκις 
ἐξανδραποδισθέντες ἤ τινα πυθέσθαι ἡμέων. συμβουλεύομεν δὲ ὑμῖν δοῦναι ὑμέας αὐτοὺς 
Ἀθηναίοισι, πλησιοχώροισι τε ἀνδράσι καὶ τιμωρέειν ἐοῦσι οὐ κακοῖσι.’ταῦτα συνεβούλευον 
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ κατὰ τὴν εὐνοίην οὕτω τῶν Πλαταιέων ὡς βουλόμενοι τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους ἔχειν πόνους συνεστεῶτας Βοιωτοῖσι. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέν νυν Πλ αταιεῦσι ταῦτα 
συνεβούλευον, οἳ δὲ οὐκ ἠπίστησαν, ἀλλ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἱρὰ ποιεύντων τοῖσι δυώδεκα θεοῖσι 
ἱκέται ἱζόμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ἐδίδοσαν σφέας αὐτούς. Θηβαῖοι δὲ πυθόμενοι ταῦτα 
ἐστρατεύοντο ἐπὶ τοὺς Πλαταιέας, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ σφι ἐβοήθεον. μελλόντων δὲ συνάπτειν 
μάχην Κορίνθιοι οὐ περιεῖδον, παρατυχόντες δὲ καὶ καταλλάξαντες ἐπιτρεψάντων 
ἀμφοτέρων οὔρισαν τὴν χώρην ἐπὶ τοῖσιδε, ἐᾶν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους 
ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. Κορίνθιοι μὲν δὴ ταῦτα γνόντες ἀπαλλάσσοντο, Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ ἀπιοῦσι 
ἐπεθήκαντο Βοιωτοί, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ ἑσσώθησαν τῇ μάχῃ. ὑπερβάντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς οἱ 
Κορίνθιοι ἔθηκαν Πλαταιεῦσι εἶναι οὔρους, τούτους ὑπερβάντες τὸν Ἀσωπὸν αὐτὸν 
ἐποιήσαντο οὖρον Θηβαίοισι πρὸς Πλαταιέας εἶναι καὶ Ὑσιάς. 
As the Athenians were marshalled in the precinct of Heracles, the Plataians came to help them in 
full force. The Plataians had put themselves under protection of the Athenians, and the Athenians 
had undergone many labours on their behalf. This is how they did it: Under pressure from the 
Thebans, the Plataians gave themselves up first to Cleomenes, son of Anaxandrides, and the 
Lacedaimonians, who happened to be near. They did not receive the Plataians but told them this: 
“We live farther away, and to you any aid would be pointless; you might be enslaved many times 
in advance of us being informed of anything. We advise you to give yourselves up to the 
Athenians, men who live nearby and not bad for help.” The Spartans advised this not out of good-
will towards the Plataians as much as in order to embroil the Athenians with the Boiotians. The 
Spartans advised as such to the Plataians, and they did not mistrust them, but while the Athenians 
were sacrificing to the twelve gods they came as suppliant to the altar, giving themselves up. 
When the Thebans heard this they marched against the Plataians, but the Athenians came to their 
aid. As they were about to engage in battle, the Corinthians did not stand aside: since they were 
there, they mediated between the two sides at their request, and decided their boundaries, 
allowing that the Thebans would suffer the unwilling Boiotians to not contribute to the 
Boiotians.
3
 Once the Corinthians had decided this they started to leave, but the Boiotians attacked 
the Athenians as they were leaving, but were defeated in battle. Crossing the Asopos, the 
Athenians made it the border between the Thebans and Plataia and Hysiai. (trans. A. de 
Sélincourt). 
 
Interpretation of this account has led to various extremes in scholarship. Some regard it as a 
complete fabrication inspired by the contemporary events in which Herodotus was writing. 
Others see it as a truthful history that details the situation circa 519.
4
 A third strand of 
                                                          
3
 Following the translation of Mackil (2013), 27. Another is “to subscribe to the Boiotoi,” by Hammond (2000). He 
mentions that τελέειν normally means “to pay taxes,” which would support Mackil’s notion. 
4
 Moretti (1962) and Hennig (1992) completely disregard it as a fabrication. Those who have loyally followed it as 
the original story for 519: Beloch (1893-1904), I 391; Meyer (1884-1902), 723; Cloché (1952), 30ff.; Hammond 
(1955, 1992); Gomme (1956), II 358; Buck (1972), 94-96; Picirilli (1973), 42-46, no.9; Frost (1984), 291; Prandi 
(1988), 27-41; Badian (1993),109-124; Schachter (2016a); Hornblower (1991), 464. 
scholarship has noted the apparent discrepancies between the story presented here and the date 
given by Thucydides. Their criticism is principally aimed at the “incidental” presence around 
Plataia of the Spartan king Cleomenes and the Corinthians at that time. This leads them to 
suggest that the alliance transpired either in 509 or 506, when these two parties can be placed in 
the vicinity of Plataia.
5
 On both occasions, Cleomenes guided troops into Attica with hopes of 
installing a befriended aristocrat, Isagoras, as tyrant of Athens. The only issue is that the date 
given by Thucydides prevents this. Accordingly, these scholars have emendated the text to 
correct this difficulty. There is a problem with this method, however, as there are no signs of 
corruption in this part of the Thucydidean text that would allow an emendation.
6
 These cannot be 
applied whenever it behoves the modern historian and therefore we cannot rely on textual 
alterations to conform ancient history to our preferences.  
That is not to deny the merit of cherry picking Herodotus’ account for subtleties that belie 
a possible later date than the one given by Thucydides. Especially if we emancipate ourselves of 
the notion that there is no middle-ground between the divergent strands of thought, there are 
options at hand. What united these scholars was a preference to conflate these two accounts in 
one inaugural event, thereby ignoring the complexities and nuances that this relationship merits. 
What available clues could point towards two separate events? 
Other scholars have pointed at the presence of Cleomenes and the Corinthians, but there 
are other indications that it treats a period after the Peisistratid tyranny. Whenever Herodotus 
treats the tyranny, he normally names the Peisistratids as the actors in events involving other 
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 Grote (1846-1856), II 442, n. 54; Busolt (1885-1904), II 399, n. 4; French (1960), 91; Salmon (1978), 20ff.; Amit 
(1970); Ducat (1973); Tausend (1992), 181-182 all follow 509, with Konecny, et al. (2013) the most recent 
adherent. Shrimpton (1984) proposed 506; Anderson (2003), 259 n. 11 sees the latter as a viable option. 
6
 Develin (1990), 506 stands as the year Attica was invaded by Boiotian, Chalkidians and Peloponnesian troops: 
Burn (1962), 187-188; Cook (1983), 92; Berthold (2002) propose 507. For the arguments presented here, however, 
this debate has little impact.  
poleis or rulers.
7
 On other occasions, perhaps in an attempt to emphasise the difference between 
the two, the Athenians are juxtaposed with the tyrants in the text. Either the former are subjected 
to the Peisistratids, or they actively oppose them (Hdt. 1.62-63; cf. 1.59-60). That provides a 
stark contrast with the democracy. In those cases, Herodotus speaks of the Athenians as 
independent actors pursuing their own policies.
8
 The omission of any Peisistratid involvement in 
the Plataian episode is therefore striking: it only describes how the Plataians came under 
Athenian protection. 
The terminology employed by Herodotus is distinctively different from Thucydides, who 
speaks of an alliance (symmachia), whereas Herodutus uses verbs such as ἐδεδώκεσαν.9 The 
latter has frequently been mistaken to imply some form of slavery due to a myopic reading of the 
evidence. Nevertheless, an unequal relationship is alluded to. A recent proposal clarifies this 
puzzling situation. Crane argues for a form of client-patron relationship that incorporates the 
inequality in autonomy without equating the Plataians with slaves.
10
 That could mean that there 
was a development in the relationship with the original alliance evolving into a stricter, unequal 
one. This reading appears to be supported by Thucydides, who at the start of the Peloponnesian 
War mentions that the besieged Plataians had to confer with the Athenians before they could take 
any sort of action, reminiscent of the relationship Herodotus describes (Thuc. 2.73.1; Cf. 3.54.4; 
3.64.3). That leaves us with the issue of the nature of the Thucydidean alliance, and the 
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 Particularly Hdt. 5.94; 6.39; cf. 1.61; 5.63; 5.65; 5.91; 6.35. 
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 Cf. Hdt. 5.64; 5.73; 5.77-79; 5.91. It was also the Athenians who were making sacrifices at the Altar and they are 
involved in all the actions undertaken: defending the Plataians, marching out against the Thebans, beating them in 
battle and re-delineating the borders. A similar sentiment comes from Anderson (2003), 259 n. 11 that the actions 
undertaken are more in line with the early democracy after the fall of the tyranny. 
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 Sommerstein and Bayliss (2013), 186, n. 3 mention that Herodotus rarely uses symmachia and if so, only in 
combination with omnumi or horkos. Yet there are no signs in the fragment 6.108 that even suggest an alliance or 
treaty. 
10
 Badian (1989), (1993), 221 n. 27 for a state of douleia. His over-reliance on Paus. 1.32.3 is noteworthy, especially 
because subsequent archaeological research at Marathon undermines the Periget’s story somewhat, that the Plataians 
were thrown in together with the slaves, cf. Hammond (1992); Mersch (1995); Raaflaub (2004), 76-78 for objections 
to this notion of douleia. For the client-patron relationship: Crane (2001). 
similarities in his work to Herodotus’ account, when the Plataians describe their dealings with 
Athens. How to solve this conundrum?  
For the first issue it is important to make the distinction between the political entities 
described by the two authors. Symmachia simply means an accord to fight together between two 
equal partners. The origin of the symmachia can be traced back to earlier Archaic times when it 
entailed connections forged between elites for a specific military need. Later it also incorporated 
future potential needs and was extended to include whole communities.
11
 In a sense, this reflects 
Peisistratid Athens. The tyrants were the community in terms of foreign interaction on behalf of 
the Athenian polis on the level of intra-polis relations.
12
 The tyrants were still in charge in 519. 
That means that the alliance Thucydides refers to is an alliance between the tyrants and the 
Plataians, or at least the elite in charge of the latter. Creating bonds with elites in central Greece 
seems commonplace in Peisistratid tactics, as they had befriended the Thebans and Thessalians. 
With the tyrants’ influence in the Cyclades waning, increasing their efforts to fortify their 
northern position made sense.
13
 
The second aspect is a matter of intertextuality and mutual awareness between both 
Herodotus and Thucydides. In a convincing fashion Simon Hornblower has argued that 
Thucydides relies on Herodotus for a majority of the historical narrative prior to the Persian 
Wars in the speeches in his work, including the Plataian speeches during their trial in 427.
14
 
After being besieged by Spartan and Theban forces for several years, the Plataians finally 
surrendered. The Plataians then were submitted to a trial with Spartan judges, who would decide 
about their fate. Both the Thebans and Plataians were allowed to speak during the trial, with the 
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 Hall (2007), 101-102. 
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 Tausend (1992), 114-118. 
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 For the loss of influence in the Cyclades: Plut. de Hdt. Mal. 21, cf. Hdt. 1.61, 1.64; Arist. AP 15.2-3. 
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 Hornblower (1996), 130-133. 
latter making a case for their innocence with regards to Athenian imperialism. In their defence, 
the Plataians  relate their history with the Athenians and astutely remark that the Spartans had 
turned them away and deferred them to their southern neighbours, a story reminiscent of 
Herodotus’ account (Thuc. 3.55.1-3). This similarity probably has a shared provenance that led 
to a conflation of both accounts. The basis is history as the Plataians themselves perceive it. The 
original date of the alliance and the story that Herodotus narrates morphed into one shared past 
as it is remembered by the Plataians in the 420s, the presumed period of Herodotus’ work.15 
Intentional history may be at work here. Gehkre describes this term in the following way: “Social 
knowledge of the past, in other words that which a society knows and holds for true about its 
past, its ‘intentional history’, is of fundamental significance for the imaginaire, for the way a 
society interprets and understands itself, and therefore its inner coherence and ultimately its 
collective identity.”16  
We see that best at work in Thucydides when he narrates the Plataian trial. The Plataians 
themselves start their history with the Persian Wars as their departure point for the shared history 
with the Spartans. They claim to have acted well by mentioning their part in the struggle against 
the Persians. Their role in that conflict actually turns into a defining moment in their history as 
they juxtapose themselves with the Thebans by claiming that the Plataians were the only one of 
the Boiotians to have opposed the Persians. Here we see the creation of a “unique Plataian” 
perspective. Yet Herodotus mentions the Thespians also fighting against the Persian forces at 
Thermopylae.
17
 Of course, what matters during their defence in the trial is what they believe to 
be true, which  is why they enumerate their numerous good deeds. The Plataians even refer to 
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 Flower and Marincola (2002), 2. 
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 Gehkre (2001), 286. For the term, cf. Gehrke (1994). Also: Foxhall et al. (2010). 
17
 Thuc.3.54.3; for the Thespians, cf. 7.222; 8.50. 
“these great and historical occasions.”18 Basically, their defence consists of a summary of their 
history vis-à-vis the Spartans, mentioning the Spartan role in creating an Athenian-Plataian 
alliance, before turning to an accusation of the Thebans. They appropriated history and 
transformed it into a version of their own that emphasised their own merits and interpretation of 
events.
19
   
For the besieged Plataians, after at least sixty years of rivalry with Thebes, their shared 
history had become one of perpetual hostility. They even evoke this image themselves as they 
move to their complaints regarding the Thebans. The Plataians mention the Thebans, “who have 
wronged us repeatedly, and their last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into 
our present position …”20 In their minds, the Thebans were the vicious oppressors, even repeat 
offenders, and as such, were entrenched in Plataian  memory as the eternal opponent.
21
 Other 
times of less intense struggle or enmity were forgotten as they did not fit in with the current 
situation and attitudes. With Plataia eventually folding under Theban pressure in 427, coupled 
with the Athenian self-image of protectors of suppliants against unjust warmongers – notably 
Theban aggressors – this story correlates best to the topical vicissitudes suffered by the Plataians 
which would resonate well in Athens itself.
 22
  
That it is possible to leave out parts of history for the sake of historical and rhetorical 
arguments is proven by the Plataians themselves. At the end of the trial, when they evoke the 
Spartan role in establishing a Plataian-Athenian rapprochement, they make it seem as if their 
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 Thuc. 3.55.1: ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα τοιοῦτοι ἠξιώσαμεν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ ἐγενόμεθα ὕστερον. 
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 One can think here of Euripides’ Suppliants. Cf. Steinbock (2013), 175 n. 95 for further remarks. There is also 
little doubt that contemporary events coloured his descriptions of the past in Herodotus: Bowie (2007), 30. 
special bond with the southern neighbours only started after the Persian Wars.
23
 They thus 
blatantly advocate a different history, which demonstrates the malleability of common memory. 
The passage of time had enabled them to do so as a right amount of time had elapsed for memory 
to become more flexible. With the “survivors” of the initial phase gone, the stories of the past 
could be remembered by the newer generations in the fashion that best corresponded to their 
needs and contemporary situation.
24
 Instead of referring back to their earliest relations with the 
Peisistratids, what was remembered was their perpetual struggle with the Thebans after years of 
toil and the destruction of their town during the Persian Wars. That egregious Theban behaviour 
lay at the root of the Athenian rapprochement certainly fitted the bill better than any other earlier 
history that did not contain such political vitriol.  
Nevertheless, Thucydides is adamant in referring to 519 as the date of the alliance. In the 
words of Simon Hornblower, there is a tragic akribeia that strengthens the message needed to 
bring across: the futility of the Plataian-Athenian connection.
25
 Indeed, Thucydides had 
constructed a tragic arch that culminated in that final remark which simultaneously shows the 
longevity and futility of the alliance, as he laments the polis’ fate. But the aorist employed here 
suggests a past event that does not necessarily entail a continuous process. In other words, the 
first alliance or contact was arranged in 519 but could have been interrupted in the intermittent 
period. 
 Another important aim of Thucydides in this part of his works was to present the otiose 
uses of the past in rhetorical practice and particularly in interstate relations. Both sides offer 
conflicting histories to support their argument and thereby sacrifice the historical truth for 
argumentative needs. These histories are clearly permeated by contemporary attitudes towards 
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one another and twist the past in order to achieve results in the present. Thucydides took issue 
with the application of these traditional modes of memory that misrepresent the truth.
26
 By 
mentioning the date of the alliance, he offers a memento of this attitude. Moreover, it serves as a 
rectification to the falsified past that both sides utilised, most notably the Plataian implicit claim 
that their relationship with the Athenians did not antedate the Persian Wars.   
Of course, this close reading can solve certain difficulties facing us in reading these texts. 
Yet, some unanswered questions still remain. What is the basis for assuming the story was 
adapted to reflect later hostilities? Is it possible to find traces of a more cordial past between the 
protagonists that they have so cleverly hidden in their own version of history? 
II The Peisistratids, Plataians and Thebans: imagined hostilities 
From a fifth and fourth century perspective, it seems inevitable that the two Boiotian neighbours 
would collide. But new inscriptions, combined with the archaeological data from Boiotia, could 
illuminate an earlier phase when the two neighbours lived harmoniously alongside each other.
27
 
In turn, this disproves the premise that the initial alliance of 519 aggrieved the Thebans, causing 
hostilities with the Peisistratids. By reviewing other alleged hostilities between the latter two it 
will become clear that these instances should be rejected and thereby any other proofs of enmity.  
A first clue can be gauged from newly unearthed bronze tablets from Thebes. The entire 
text still needs to be published, but a preliminary version has appeared. One tablet stands out, as 
it mentions the sale or lease of lands owned by prominent Thebans.
28
 Most intriguing about these 
lands is their location, with some located outside the Theban chora, more precisely in the 
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 Bintliff (1994, 1999, 2002) assumes that the ever expanding territories of the city-states in Boiotia with Plataia 
growing as well to create a self-reliant community. These tendencies would lead to clashes between neighbours but 
the evidence for Theban expansion in the sixth century points strongly in a northern direction, rather than a southern. 
Cf. the critical remarks by Mackil (2013), 22 n. 2 on the central-place theory and the dominance of autarky in 
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28
 Thebes Mus. Inv. 35909; SEG 60.507. The properties in question are described as: ἐπ’Ασοπõ; δι’Ασοπõ and 
ποτ’ Εὐάκροι δι’Ασοπõ by Matthaiou in his preliminary notes. 
Parasopia, the region that later was heavily contested by both the Plataians and their bigger 
neighbour. The reason for the sale or lease is unknown, but speculations has been offered. 
Matthaiou, for instance, proposes to connect it to the Herodotean account. In that case the 
properties could have been owned by Theban citizens in the context of a Boiotian koinon and, 
after a falling-out and Athenian intervention, had to be sold.
29
 The early existence of the koinon 
had been seriously doubted, but this new evidence appears to vindicate proponents of it.
30
 There 
is a possibility that the Plataians had been members of this early form of collaborative 
community or polity as well.
31
 That proposal is not as conjectural as it seems, as they may have 
been members of the Boiotoi in the mid-fifth century: to put it into perspective, that was after a 
half-century marked by hostility.
32
  
Perhaps this inscription indicates a previous peaceful co-existence in the earlier sixth 
century as the lettering is tentatively dated to the late sixth century.
33
 The protection offered by a 
larger neighbour could have been the main reason as Plataia had suffered from an earthquake 
sometime after 550 and therefore could have found itself in a vulnerable position in the latter half 
of the sixth century.
34
 Thebes would have been an obvious choice.  
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 Some myopic interpretations of the Boiotoi have dominated the debate on the forming of koina, but the 
complexities of the underlying structures of the later koinon have been brilliantly elaborated upon by Mackil (2013). 
See the remarks in Beck and Ganter (2015) as well.  
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 Plataia’s membership has been doubted: Bruce (1968), 190; Sordi (1968), 70 and Prandi (1988), 79-91. Others 
scholars accept its membership; Larsen (1960), 12; Roesch (1965b), 40; Amit (1971), (1973), 87. The proponents 
base themselves on Hell. Oxy. 16.13 (Bartoletti). The author describes the situation after the destruction of Plataia 
(ca. 400 B.C.E.), with the Thebans taking over the two Boiotarchs that were previously assigned to Plataia, Scolus, 
Erythrae and Scaphae. That in itself does not prove membership, but that the Plataians had a Boiotarch assigned to 
them before is striking.  
33
 Matthaiou (2014). It resembles the kioniskos dated to 507/6 and found in the same excavation, cf. Aravantinos 
(2006). 
34
 Konecny, et al. (2013), 26; 164-168. See the remarks in Horden and Purcell (2000), 305-307 about the ability of 
communities to quickly recover from earthquakes. Yet what is meant here is not so much an utter destruction and 
destitution, but merely a temporary setback in Plataia’s security and prosperity. 
A recent find from Thebes adds plausibility to those prospects. The inscription – again 
from the previously mentioned find – deals with an arbitration case that pitted the Megarians 
against the Thebans and Eleutherians, the latter a small town in the Attic-Boiotian frontier 
region.
35
 Two aspects of this text are particularly striking. One is the Megarian encroachment 
upon the border that divides their territory from Boiotia. They have staked their claim on a piece 
of land that was formerly controlled by an unknown community. Perhaps their behaviour 
threatened the Plataians as well, seeing that their neighbours came into dispute with the 
Megarians. The other emphatic feature is the enigmatic union between the Thebans and 
Eleutherians. According to the preliminary reading, the text in lines 5-6 reads κἐνίκασε̣ hα 
πόλις hα Θε̣βαί|ον κἐλευθεραίο̣[ν]. Its wording resembles the later form of indicating 
sympoliteia, maybe reflecting the close ties between Thebes and Eleutherai within the context of 
an early koinon.
36
 If this is correct, and considering the location of Eleutherai, it means that 
Thebes’ territory would have already bordered on Plataia’s in an earlier phase than previously 
assumed.  
A phrase in Thucydides may reveal a possible Plataian membership in the koinon. During 
the trial in 427, the Thebans offer a relatively distorted view of the Plataian approach to the 
Athenians. Claims were made over the original inhabitants and settlement of the town, as well as 
confounding “mythical” times with the late sixth century.37 That this version of events is 
unmistakeably tampered with by the Thebans to fit their purposes is clear. But it would be too 
easy to simply dismiss it as propaganda. For the Thebans, it warranted mention that it was the 
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 Cf.  SEG 19, 678; SEG 37, 984, 987.  Of course, these are much later examples, but a similar unequal relationship 
between Thebes and a smaller polity close-by, such as Eleutherai, is not out of the question. 
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 Thuc. 3.61.2: ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα πρῶτον ὅτι ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς 
ἅλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἂλλα χωρία μετ᾽αὐτῆς, ἅ ξυμμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν 
οὖτοι, ὣσπερἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ἡμῶν, ἒξω δὲ τῶν ἂλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ 
πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μετ’αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς 
ἔβλαπτον, ἀνθ᾽ὧν καὶ ἀντέπασχον. 
Plataians’ fault for breaking up their peaceful relations, not the Thebans. They thus created a 
history in which the Plataian-Athenian alliance lay at the root of their disputes. It was also an 
attempt by the Thebans to place the Athenian alliance as the start of Plataian history and belittle 
the latter’s involvement in the Persian wars.38 Notwithstanding the obvious propagandistic 
locution, there can be some truth in a previous arrangement that saw both parties living 
harmoniously. 
This rhetoric is employed by the Thebans to dismiss the Persian Wars as the watershed in 
their relations with the two other protagonists. Neither of them refer to the times before the 
alliance between Plataians and Athenians. Sieving through their statements and stripping off the 
layers of “deceit,” their reluctance is not only a matter of rhetorical tricks. They refused to refer 
to these earlier times, as they were times of harmony, rather than hostility which did not fit their 
purposes in the trial. That could have opened the door to supporting the Thebans’ claim, and 
thereby weakened their defence in the process. That is where Thucydides comes into play. 
Whereas our sources often stress periods of conflict, the historian here tries to correct the 
distorted histories. His correction of these fallacies points to an earlier start of the entanglement 
that both parties did not wish to recall. This leads to the possibility that the original alliance did 
not aggravate affairs, nor drove a wedge between the Peisistratids and Thebans. 
That would have been quite a turnaround in their affairs, as their early relations were 
characterised by friendship, a friendship that appears to have continued throughout the tyranny.. 
In 546 the Thebans had been ardent financial supporters of the latest attempt by Peisistratus to 
obtain the tyranny in Athens.
39
 He was appreciative of this support and showed himself a faithful 
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 Hdt. 1.61; Arist. AP 15.2. The Theban support may have been based on previous endeavours, as Hdt. 1.61 notes. 
Based on the reciprocal aristocratic relations of that time, it was not uncommon to return the favour according to 
Herman (1987)  
recipient, with traces of his reciprocal generosity reflected in a possible sponsorship at the 
Apollo Ptoios temple in Boiotia.
40
 The early period is marked by friendship but according to 
certain strands of scholarship, matters deteriorated in the 530s as the Eleutherians decided to 
dislodge themselves from Boiotia and turn towards the Peisistratids, to the dismay of the 
Thebans.
41
 The Peisistratids certainly would have showed themselves to be ungrateful friends, if 
they were responsible for this new situation. Therefore, others have rejected this date and 
propounded a later date, at the end of the sixth century after the rise of the democracy.
42
 The new 
document from Thebes appears to support this later date.  
A similar critical approach can be applied to other assumed grievances between the two. 
One notorious example is the Alcmeonid attempt to overthrow the tyrants in 511/0. In this 
campaign they used a fortress built at Leipsydrion under the peaks of Mount Parnes as their base. 
Due to its frontier position – and coupled with the desertions of Plataia and Eleutherai before the 
attack – it was naturally assumed that the Thebans had been willing supporters of this coup and 
permitted the Alcmeonids to use Boiotian territory as a base.
43
 Yet our sources do not mention 
this alleged involvement.
44
 Nor is it certain that there was any need for external intervention to 
accomplish the feat. Mount Parnes was on the edge of Peisistratid control so it was possible for 
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 Buck (1979), 113-114. 
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 Hdt. 5.62.2; Arist. AP 19.3.; Aristoph. Schol. ad Lys. 665. 
the Alcmeonids and their partisans to gather on the outskirts of Attica, outside the grasp of the 
tyrants.
45
  
Another point is the overthrow of the tyrants. If the Thebans were as agitated with the 
Peisistratids as they are commonly portrayed to be, surely they would have been involved in their 
disposal. But that is not the case. Of course we are dealing with scanty source material, but their 
reticence on two occasions is at least striking. Though prudence is warranted in employing an 
argumentation ex silentio, this point merits more analysis. It offers verification of an alliance 
between the tyrants and the Plataians. Like their Boiotian “brethren,” the Plataians are a 
noticeable omission in the historical record regarding the removal of the Peisistratids. Conversly, 
there are indications that corroborate an alliance between the two. Their support for the latter is 
implied by the fact that the Thessalian cavalry, sent to support the tyrants, passed through 
Plataian territory unhindered. Passive support is not conclusive, but does point in the direction of 
collaboration. But why did the Plataians not defend their allies more overtly? Herodotus provides 
an answer: the Athenian tyrants only reached out to one particular ally for help, the 
Thessalians.
46
  
That allows for the eventuality that the Plataians were not approached for support. Why 
so? Perhaps they were already friends with the Spartans at that time, which could also explain 
why they approached Cleomenes when under duress. Another explanation is more mundane: the 
military prowess of the Thessalian cavalry. These added something special to the Peisistratid 
forces, something the Plataians could not offer. The cavalry was instrumental in the victory and 
can be conceived of as part of a presupposed plan. The first battle between Peisistratid partisans 
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 Anderson (2003), 34. The area ruled by the Peisistratids was probably restricted to the natural boundaries formed 
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46 Hdt. 5.63.3: Οἱ δὲ Πεισιστρατίδαι προτυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα ἐπεκαλέοντο ἐκ Θεσσαλίης ἐπικουρίην: 
ἐπεποίητο γάρ σφι συμμαχίη πρὸς αὐτούς. Note Herodotus’ wording here, as opposed to his wording regarding 
the Plataian situation.  
and Spartans makes that clear: the fields around Phaleron were mown to optimise the 
effectiveness of cavalry (Hdt. 5.63.4). These explications are not diametrically opposed; rather, 
they can reinforce one another. The lack of military benefits offered by the Plataians neutralised 
the need to avoid a potential conflict of interest from their side. The potential advantage of the 
Plataian contingent did not outweigh the uncertainty of their commitment, or even the risk of a 
volte-face.   
A final note is linked to the Thessalian connection to the Peisistratids. Their friendly 
relations with the Peisistratids did not sever the latter’s ties vis-à-vis the Thebans, as it is often 
claimed. The ambiguity surrounding this position and extremities in dating prevents any 
plausible argument to be made to regard the Thessalians as catalysts in the political landscape of 
central Greece at the end of the sixth century.
47
  
In the following section I intend to explore the context of 507/6 and the developments in 
polity building in Boiotia. It describes a possible reason for why there was a conflict between the 
Thebans and Plataians at that time after peaceful collaboration. This will contextualise the story 
of Herodotus and offer a plausible alternative setting for the formation of a new alliance between 
Athens and Plataia.  
III Conflict and centralisation in Boiotia 
The downfall of the tyranny and the rise of the democracy brought about a dramatic change on 
the Attic peninsula, both in its political system and its spatial organisation.
48
 The limited political 
grasp of the tyranny was replaced by an all-encompassing political system that incorporated all 
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For these changes, see for instance Anderson (2003), but also Siewert (1982) and Traill (1974). 
of Attica with Athens as its centre. Before this, the frontier region was marked by fluidity with 
less emphasis on political inclusion; but the democracy strove to establish its frontier with 
conspicuous, monumental constructions meant to demarcate the geographical limits of Attica.
49
 
Naturally, the integration of various contested border-areas such as Oinoe and Phyle could have 
upset some in Thebes, especially because Boiotia witnessed its own experiments in state-
building at the end of the sixth century. 
In the second half of the sixth century, the northern half of Boiotia was occupied with 
war as evinced by the numerous dedications at the Zeus sanctuary at Olympia.
50
 Increasingly, it 
seems the Thebans and their allies were gaining the upper hand over their nemesis, the 
Orchomenians. Their friendship with the Peisistratids had kept their southern flank safe and 
allowed them to focus all efforts on the north. New-found Theban confidence as the de-facto 
leader of the Boiotians is best reflected in the appearance of dedications made by these 
“Boiotoi.”51 Their increased emergence in the last quarter of the sixth century could point to 
redoubled efforts to create a common polity.
52
 With the reticent attitude of the Peisistratids, a 
similar process could have taken place in southern Boiotia. The change in Athenian leadership 
would have swiftly changed this outlook. Instead of a “far-away” friend, the Thebans were 
confronted by a neighbouring power with different intentions.
53
 This change in outlook is 
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 Pelling (2006). He argues that a tyrant offers external advantages to its neighbours and is therefore of more use to 
supportive elites, like the Thebans in the case of the Peisistratids, than other forms of government. 
probably the reason for the Boiotians’ involvement in the second attempt to install Isagoras as 
tyrant of Athens in 507/6 to replace the democracy.
54
  
 The appropriation of the borderlands by the democracy then could have affected matters 
in southern Boiotia as well, the area that lay at the heart of the Plataian-Theban dispute. The 
chain of reactions could have progressed up to the point that disputes arose within southern 
Boiotia, disrupting the previous peaceful co-existence between Plataia and Thebes. According to 
Herodotus, tensions arose because the Thebans “pressured” (πιεζεύμενοι) their neighbour. 
πιέζειν often means to claim resources, either cash and crop resources, or land. Throughout 
Herodotus the πιεζόμενοι are specifically those who face losing their land to expansionist 
encroachments or through military action.
55
 From the aftermath of the dispute it becomes clear 
that land-redistribution was an issue, as the Corinthians decided to delineate the borders between 
the two poleis. According to Bonner and Smith, the borders were only of secondary importance. 
The new inscription from Thebes seems to confirm that image.
56
 
The other resolution issued by the Corinthians regarded a different matter of primary 
importance: ἐᾶν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. Recent work 
on this particular phrase offers a fresh perspective on the situation. Older translations 
automatically assumed that the sentence should be translated as “the Thebans should leave alone 
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those unwilling to join the Boiotoi.”57 The problem with that particular translation is that it 
assumed that either the Plataians had never been part of the Boiotoi and were now forced to join 
a group with that name. A more pressing point, however, is the usage of the verb in Herodotus. 
Throughout his work, τελέειν predominantly refers to financial contributions or financial 
transactions. The anomaly between translation and usage has led Emily Mackil to propose a 
different translation. Rather than emphasising the need to “join” a developed federal structure, it 
should be read as “those unwilling to contribute to the Boiotoi” or “take part” in them. In her 
view, the phrase could relate to the tripodophoria ritual, whereby neighbouring communities 
brought tripods to the Theban Apollo Ismenios temple to signal the ritual transfer of their 
territory to the Thebans and thereby become “Boiotian.”58 Evidence for this practice comes from 
the epigraphical record. One dedication to the deity comes from the Potnians, a community in the 
Parasopia and close to Thebes.
59
 Other attestations prove more difficult as the dedicants’ names 
are too lacunose to prove anything.
60
  
Most of these dedications are dated to the late sixth and early fifth century. This is 
striking, as apparently the Thebans started demanding proofs of loyalty from the neighbouring 
communities. It coincides with the period of the Cleisthenic reforms that incorporated the outer 
edges of the Attic peninsula. Could it be that the Thebans wished to counteract this Athenian 
expansionism  because of fears that the Athenians could reach out to border communities in the 
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frontier as well, such as those  in the Parasopia? With the Plataians’ previous ties to Athens in 
mind, their loyalty towards Thebes may have been waning. These confirmations of allegiance 
can then be placed in a context of territorial dispute, especially with the fertile lands of the 
Parasopia at stake.
61
  
At the same time, parts of Boiotia were undergoing radical changes with a new polity 
taking hold. Whether or not it is possible to speak of a federal system, it is certain that the 
communal identity uniting Boiotians had been developing in this period and was providing a 
blueprint for collaboration.
62
 That movement was spearheaded by the Thebans who were joined 
by other communities.
63
 A looming foreign threat could have been presented the perfect 
opportunity to rally the troops under one united banner. The Thebans could point to the need for 
collaborative actions while simultaneously expanding their grasp over the southern frontier of the 
region. 
The opportunity to oppose this freshly arisen threat presented itself in 507/6 and might 
serve as one possible explanation for the use of shared Boiotian coinage at this time. Besides the 
obvious economic function to ease commercial interaction, one of the other functions of 
collective coinage is military collaboration.
64
 Especially the larger denominations could be 
connected to the campaigns of 507/6 as the pay for soldiers demanded minting a large amount of 
coinage.
65
  
In my opinion, these examples paint a picture of increasing “centralisation” of Theban 
power within Boiotia, partially to expand their own power and to enhance their ability to cope 
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with other larger poleis, and partially to respond to the growing power of the Athenians in the 
south. In that sense, it was the perfect combination of internal forces and external influences.
66
 It 
could therefore be in this context that the Plataians came under duress from the Thebans, and 
subsequently approached the Athenians. The pressure exerted by the Thebans could allude to two 
forms of “contributing” to the Boiotoi. In one form, it means financial and manpower 
contributions to the war-effort But it also meant a proof of devotion to the Boiotoi as other 
communities in the Parasopia had submitted to. As this entailed losing their territory – their land 
becoming Theban - the latter demand can explain why the choice between Thebans and 
Athenians was an easy one for the Plataians: even if they entered into a client-patron 
relationship, at least they kept their territorial rights. 
The Athenians were located close-by and were an obvious ally against the Theban forces. 
Moreover, with the fall of the Peisistratids, their alliance with the Plataians may have come to an 
end - but that does not mean their relationship with Athens had been lost overnight.
67
 
Considering the dire situation the Plataians were in, extreme measures were warranted to obtain 
Athenian support: that is where supplication comes into play.   
Supplication was often the last refuge in diplomatic interaction and reflected the 
predicament the suppliant was in. Acceptance was not a given, despite common assumptions.
68
 
Even if all the traditional actions or supplication had been undertaken, the decision still lay with 
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the supplicandus, as Cleomenes’ behaviour towards the Plataians shows.69 Thus, the Peisistratids 
would not have been forced to accept the plea as it often mistakenly assumed.
70
 If acceptance led 
to a confrontation with the Thebans, it was an easily avoidable conflict for the tyrants, unless one 
ascribes to them malicious attitudes towards their friends.
71
 Unless one is willing to accept 
ambivalent examples of hostility between them, there is no ground to accept such motives 
groundlessly.  
On the other hand, the deliberate choice to accept the Plataians’ plea better aligns with 
strategic considerations by the young democracy, with the Boiotian armies under Theban 
auspices plundering the outskirts of Attica. As hostilities were already underway, a potential 
buffer zone between the Theban and Athenian spheres of influence seems like sound logic and 
Plataia is a prime candidate for such a role.
72
 Moreover, interventionist politics in Boiotia suit the 
democracy better than the tyranny as the tyrants had been on good terms with the Thebans. The 
democracy had no such considerations and protecting the Plataians also served the additional 
                                                          
69
 Hdt. 6.108.1-2. Presumably he had no intentions of interfering with the affairs of the Thebans, what could equally 
apply to the Peisistratids.  
70
 E.g. Mafodda (1996), 107-108: “una opportuna motivazione religiosa alla decisione del tiranno di schierarsi dalla 
parte di Platea contro Tebe.” He is not completely wrong in believing it would have offered the Peisistratids a 
religious excuse to accept the Plataians, but that does not explain their willingness to affront the Thebans, unless one 
adheres to the notion that the two parties had been alienated (but see above). 
71
 Interesting in this aspect is also the analysis of the situation by Plut. de Hdt. mal. 861e: εἰ µὴ κακοήθης 
Ἡρόδοτος, ἐπίβουλοι µὲν Λακεδαιµόνιοι καὶ κακοήθεις, ἀναίσθητοι δ'Ἀθηναῖοι παρακρουσθέντες, Πλαταιεῖς 
δ' οὐ κατ' εὔνοιαν οὐδὲ τιµὴν ἀλλὰ πολέµου πρόφασις εἰς µέσον ἐρρίφησαν (“If then Herodotus is not malicious, 
the Lacedaemonians must have been both fraudulent and spiteful; and the Athenians fools, in suffering themselves 
to be thus imposed on; and the Plataeans were brought into play, not for any good-will or respect, but as an occasion 
of war”). 
72
 Hostilities may have broken out in the intermittent period between the downfall of the tyranny and the democracy 
(or continued after the events of 507/6) see the dedication to commemorate a victory over the Tanagraians by an 
unknown victor.  Schachter (2016b) offers a compelling case to view the Athenians as the dedicants. For the buffer 
role and control of important routes, cf. Thuc. 2.71-8; Amit (1973), 88-98; Kagan (1974), 103; 172-176; Hornblower 
(1991), 357-361. There is also new evidence from Thebes that illuminates the Boiotian perspective for participation 
in this war, presumably over the outlying regions: SEG 56.521. First versions of the inscription’s text can be found 
in Aravantinos (2006); BE 2008 no. 236. See also Berti (2010). Herodotus’ narrative suggests some time had 
elapsed between the capture of the outer edges of Athens and the eventual defeat of the Boiotian forces (Mackil 
(2013), 188).  
purpose of disrupting the Theban expansion in the southern region of Boiotia and keeping the 
region atomised, rather than united under Theban auspices.  
That the young democracy was more adventurous than the preceding tyranny is perhaps 
best described by Herodotus himself. After describing the invasion of 507/6 B.C.E., he goes on 
to say that the democracy has given the Athenians unprecedented confidence bordering on 
recklessness.
73
 That the Athenians were unafraid of venturing beyond the borders and 
establishing a presence abroad, is shown by their actions at Chalkis after their military victory. 
Having vanquished the Chalkidians, the Athenians not only expelled a large group of the 
defeated, but also founded a cleruchy to be inhabited by Athenians and to keep the Chalkidians 
in check.
74
 Another example of their new found confidence is the dedication of a four-horse 
chariot at the Acropolis to commemorate their victory. The inscription accompanying it is 
unequivocal in its message, especially the part that specifies punishing the Boiotians and 
Chalkidians for their hybris.
75
 In other words, the new government of Athens was celebrating its 
new place in Greek affairs in a grandiose manner.  
IV Conclusion 
In this article I have offered a new, perhaps account of the Plataian-Athenian alignment. 
Although the reconstruction has its controversial aspects, it does not undermine the paramount 
importance of revisiting this oft frequented event. The controversy that surrounds this alliance 
has intrigued scholars since the nineteenth century. Options have included emending the 
Thucydidean text to accommodate historical circumstances. What I hope to have shown is that it 
                                                          
73
 Hdt. 5.79: εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέαςπεριοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνου 
ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷπρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. There is a possibility that the brash behavior of the early 
democracy is a retrojection from the period after the Persian Wars, cf. Forsdyke (2001). Also, the Cleisthenic 
programme significantly boosted the numbers of men Athens could utilize in wars: van Effenterre (1976); Frost 
(1984); Singor (2000). 
74
 Hdt. 5.77.2-3. For the remains of the cleruchy’s fortress, cf. Coulton, et al. (2002). 
75
 Hdt. 5.77.4. The actual inscription has also been found: IG I
3
 501A+B; for a commentary, see Kaczko (2016), 1-
16. 
is possible to offer a revised account without any emendations. The consequences of this revised 
account are clear. First, there were no hostilities between the Peisistratids and Thebans, and 
certainly not because of the Plataian-Peisistratid alliance in 519.
76
 That relationship was 
interrupted by the fall of the tyrants. Secondly, Thucydides mentions the date for the alliance not 
as an ambassador of Rankean truth, but to emphasise the futility of the arguments employed by 
both parties in the Plataian debate. His date, therefore, is aimed at undermining the arguments 
presented and to correct the claims made by the Plataians that their ties to the Athenian polis do 
not antedate the Persian Wars. He merely pinpoints a date for an original alliance, but that does 
not necessarily imply a continuation of that alliance. Finally, the revised account shows that the 
rise of the Athenian democracy caused a seismic shift in the political landscape of central 
Greece. Their efforts and interference in Boiotian affairs laid the foundation for generations of 
enmity and rivalry within this tripartite relationship.  
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